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CORPORATE FINANCING AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS WHEN FIRMS
HAVE INFORMATION THAT INVESTORS DO NOT HAVE
Stewart C. Myers and Nicholas S. Majluf
ABSTRACT
This paper considers a firm that must issue common stock to raise cash to
undertake a valuable investment opportunity. Management is assumed to know
more about the firm's value than potential investors. Investors interpret the
firm's actions rationally. An equilibrium model of the issue-invest decision
is developed under these assumptions. The model shows that firms may refuse
to issue stock, and therefore may pass up valuable investment opportunities.
The model suggests explanations for several aspects of corporate financing
behavior, including the tendency to rely on internal sources of funds, and to
prefer debt to equity if external financing is required. Extensions and
applications of the model are discussed.
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CORPORATE FINANCING AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS WHEN FIRMS
HAVE INFORMATION THAT INVESTORS DO NOT HAVE
Stewart C. Myers and Nicholas S. MaJlufl
Consider a firm that has assets in place and also a valuable real
investment opportunity. However, it has to issue common shares to raise part
or all of the cash required to undertake the investment project. If it does
not launch the project promptly, the opportunity will evaporate. There are no
taxes, transaction costs or other capital market imperfections.
Finance theory would advise this firm to evaluate the investment
opportunity as if it already had plenty of cash on hand. In an efficient
capital market, securities can always be sold at a fair price; the net present
value of selling securities is always zero, because the cash raised exactly
balances the present value of the liability created. Thus, the decision rule
is: take every positive-NPV project, regardless of whether internal or
external funds are used to pay for it.
What if the firm's managers know more about the value of its assets and
opportunities than outside investors do? As we will show, nothing fundamental
is changed so long as managers invest in every project they know to have
positive NPV. If they do this, the shares investors buy will be correctly
priced on average, although a particular issue will be over or underpriced.
The manager's inside information creates a side bet between old and new
stockholders, but the equilibrium issue price is unaffected.
However, if managers have inside information there must be some cases in
which that information is so favorable that management, if it acts in the
interest of the old stockholders, will refuse to issue shares even if it means
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passing up a good investment opportunity. That is, the cost to old
shareholders of issuing shares at a bargain price may outweigh the project's
NPV. This possibility makes the problem interesting: investors, aware of
their relative ignorance, will reason that a decision not to issue shares
signals "good news." The news conveyed by an issue is bad or at least less
good. This affects the price investors are willing to pay for the issue,
which in turn, affects the issue-investment decision.
If the firm finally decides not to issue and therefore not to invest-and
we will show formally how this can happen--real capital investment is
misallocated and firm value reduced. Of course, we would also expect
management to try to rearrange the firm's capital structure to avoid being
caught in this "financing trap" the next time the firm has a positive-NPV
investment. Thus, our analysis of how asymmetric information affects firm's
issue-investment decisions may lead us to explain some corporate financing
choices as attempts by firms to avoid the problems we have just introduced.
The first problem is to figure out the equilibrium share price conditional
on the issue-investment decision, assuming rational investors, and also a
rational firm which bases the issue-investment decision on the price it
faces. This paper addresses that problem, and solves it under reasonable
simplifying assumptions.
The assumptions are set out and discussed in Section 1. This section also
contains a numerical example. A general formulation and solution is given in
Section 2.
However, Section 2's results raise deeper issues. Our solution assumes
that management acts in the interests of "old" (existing) stockholders. It
also assumes those stockholders are passive, and do not adjust their
III
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portfolios in response to the firm's issue-invest decision, except possibly to
buy a predetermined fraction of any new issue.
This assumption makes financing matter. A firm with ample financial
slack-e.g., large holdings of cash or marketable securities, or the ability
to issue default-risk free debt--would take all positive-NPV opportunities.
The same firm without slack would pass some up. Also, with this assumption
about management's objective, our model predicts firms will prefer debt to
equity if they need external funds.
If old shareholders are assumed to be active, and to rebalance their
portfolios in response to what they learn from the firm's actions, then
financing does not matter: financial slack has no impact on investment
decisions. Even with ample slack, the firm will pass up some positive-NPV
investments.
We can choose from three statements about management's objective under
asymmetrical information:
1. Management acts in the interests of all shareholders, and ignores any
conflict of interest between old and new shareholders.
2. Management acts in old shareholders' interest, and assumes they are
passive.
3. Management acts in old shareholders' interest, but assumes they
rationally rebalance their portfolios as they learn from the firm's
actions.
We have so far found no compelling theoretical justification for favoring
any one of these statements over the other two. A theory, or at least a
story, could be developed to support any one of the three statements. We will
suggest some of these stories as we go along. However, we do not claim to
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have a theory of managerial behavior fully supporting our model. We treat the
three statements as possible assumptions about managerial behavior. Since we
cannot udge the assumptions' realism, we turn instead to their positive
implications.
The three statements yield substantially different empirical predictions.
Statement (2) leads at this stage of the empirical race, because it explains
why stock prices fall, on average, when firms announce an equity issue.
Moreover, it explains why debt issues have less price impact than stock
issues. We briefly review this evidence in Section 3.
A model based on (a) asymmetric information and (b) management acting in
the interests of passive, old stockholders may explain several aspects of
corporate behavior, including the tendency to rly on internal sources of
funds and to prefer debt to equity if external financing is required. Some of
the model's implications are discussed in Parts 4 and 5 of the paper. We
defer the customary introductory review of the literature until the end of
Section 1, after our assumptions have been more fully explained.
1. ASSUMPTIONS AND EXAMPLE
We assume the firm (i.e., its managers) has information that investors do
not have, and that both managers and investors realize this. We take this
information asymmetry as given--a fact of life. We side-step the question of
how much information managers should release, except to note the underlying
assumption that transmitting information is costly. Our problem disappears if
managers can costlessly convey their special information to the market.
III
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The firm has one existing asset and one opportunity requiring investment
I. The investment can be financed by issuing stock, drawing down the firm's
cash balance or selling marketable securities. The sum of cash on hand and
marketable securities will be referred to as financial slack (S).
Financial slack chould also include the amount of default-risk free debt
the firm can issue. (Discussion of risky debt is deferred to Section 2.)
However, it's simpler for our purposes to let the firm use risk-free borrowing
to reduce the required investment I. We thus interpret I as required equity
investment.
The investment opportunity evaporates if the firm does not go ahead at
time t = 0. (We could just as well say that delay of investment reduces the
project's net present value.) If S < I, going ahead requires a stock issue
of E I - S. Also, the project is "all or nothing"-the firm can't take
part of it.
We assume capital markets are perfect and efficient with respect to
publicly available information. There are no transaction costs in issuing
stock. We also assume that market value of the firm's shares equals their
expected future value conditional on whatever information the market has. The
future values could be discounted for the time value of money without changing
anything essential. 2 Discounting for risk is not considered, because the
only uncertainty important in this problem stems from managers' special
information. Investors at time t = 0 do not know whether the firm's stock
price will go up or down when that special information is revealed at t = 1.
However, the risk is assumed to be diversifiable.3
We can now give a detailed statement of who knows what when.
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A Three-Date Model
1. There are three dates, t = -1, 0 and +1. At t = -1, the market 
the same information the management does. At t 0, management receives
additional information about the value of the firm's asset-in-place and
investment opportunity, and updates their values accordingly. The market de
not receive this information until t = +1.
2. The value of the asset-in-place at t = -1 is the expected future
value A = E ); the distribution of represents the asset's possible
(updated) values at t = 0. Management's updated estimate at t = 0 is a
has
)es
the realization of A.4
3. The net present value (NPV) at t -1 of the investment
opportunity is B = E(X). The distribution of represents the asset's
possible updated NPVs at t 0. Management's updated estimate at t 0
is b, the realization of .
4. Negative values for a and b are ruled out. This makes sense for
the asset-in-place because of limited liability. It makes sense for the
investment opportunity because the opportunity is discarded if it turns out to
have a negative NPV at t 0. In other words, the distribution of i is
truncated at zero.
5. Management acts in the interest of the "old" shareholders, those
owning shares at the start of t 0. That is, they maximize
Old = V(a,b,E), the "intrinsic" value of the old shares conditional on
the issue-invest decision and knowledge of the realizations a and b.
However, the market value of these shares will not generally equal V°ld,
since investors know only the distribution of
11
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and ~ and whether shares are issued. Let
P' market value at t 0 of old stockholders' shares
if stock is issued.
P = market value at t = 0 if stock is not issued.
Old stockholders are assumed passive. They "sit tight" if stock is
issued; thus the issue goes to a different group of investors. If the
firm has ample slack, and thus does not need to issue shares in order to
invest, old shareholders also sit tight if the investment is made. Thus,
acting in old stockholders' interest amounts to maximizing the true or
intrinsic value of the existing shares. (Here "true" or "intrinsic"
value means what the shares would sell for, conditional on the firms'
issue-invest decision, if investors knew everything that managers know.)
We realize this passive-stockholder assumption may be controversial.
We will discuss it further in Section 3 below.
6. Slack, S, is fixed and known by both managers and the market.
The information available to management and the market is summarized
below:
Date t = -1 t 0 t - +1
(Symmetric (Information (Symmetric
information) advantage to information)
managers)
Information
available to:
Distributions a,b;S a,b; remaining S,
Managers of I and A; S if any
Distributions Distributions a,b; remaining S,
Market of and ;S ofk andy ; S; if any
also E, either
E = 0 or'
E = I - S
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Example
The following example should give a better understanding of the problem
just posed and the steps required to solve it. Also, the example shows why a
firm may pass up a positive-NPV opportunity in a rational expectations
equilibrium.
There are two equally probable states of nature. The true state is
revealed to management at t 0 and to investors at t +1. Asset values
are:
State 1 State 2
Asset-in-Place a - 150 a - 50
Investment Opportunity (NPV) b - 20 b 10
The firm has no cash or marketable securities (S 0). The investment
opportunity requires I - 100, so the firm must issue stock to raise E - 100
if it goes ahead.
Consider a trial solution in which the firm issues stock and undertakes
the project regardless of whether the favorable or unfavorable
state occurs. In that case, P' 115 because A + B - 115.
In state 1, the true value of the firm, including 100 raised from the
stock issue, is 270. That is V Vold + Vnew 270. The market value
at t = 0 is P' + E (the old shares' market value is P', the new shares'
is E). Thus,
II
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V°ld = ( P' V 215 270 144.42
newE 100
new E V = 270 = 125.58 .
In state 2,
V = V°old + Vnew = 160
old 115
V = TiS . 160 = 85.58
Vnew 100
eVe = 2- 160 = 74.42
Note that both old and new shares are correctly priced to investors, who
regard the two states as equally probable.
P' = 1/2(144.42 + 85.58) 115
E 1/2(125.58 + 74.42) = 100
Because the firm issues stock in both states, the decision to issue tells
investors nothing about the true state.
But this trial solution is not the equilibrium solution. Look at the
payoffs to old stockholders:
Issue and Do Nothing
Payoff Invest (E = 100) (E ' 0)
old
V d in 144.42 150
state 1
Void in 85.58 50
state 2
With these payoffs, the optimal strategy is to issue and invest only in state
2, because in state 1, the market value of the old stockholders' shares is
lower when shares are issued. However, if the firm follows this strategy,
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issuing stock signals state 2 and P'
are:
Payoffs
old
V in
state 1
old
V in
state 2
drops to 60. The equilibrium payoffs
Issue and
Invest (E - 100)
Do Nothing
(E - 0)
150
60
Thus the firm passes up a good investment project (NPV - +20) in state 1.
Its market values at t 0 will be P' - 60 (state 2) and P - 150 (state
1). The average payoff to old stockholders is 1/2(150 + 60) - 105. There is
a loss of 10 in ex ante firm value--i.e., at t - -1, V - 105 vs. a potential
value of 115.
In general, whether the firm decides to issue and invest depends on the
relative values of a and b in the two states. For example, suppose we had
started with the following table:
Asset-in-Place
Investment Opportunity (NPV)
State 1
a 150
b 100
State 2
a 50
b 10
If you work through this case, you will find that the trial solution, in which
the firm is assumed to issue and invest in both states, is also the
equilibrium solution. The investment opportunity is so valuable in state 1
that the firm cannot afford to pass it up, even though new shares must be sold
- -
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for less than they are really worth. Since shares are issued in both states,
the decision to issue conveys no information, and P' A + B = 155.
But now let us go back to the original project values, which force the
firm not to issue or invest in state 1. In this case we can show that the
firm is better off with cash in the bank. If S = 100, the payoffs, net of
the additional cash investment, are:
Payoff Invest Do Nothing
Vold in 170 150
state 1
Vold in 60 50
state 2
The firm invests in both states5 and the ex ante value of the firm's real
assets is 115, 10 higher than before, because the firm avoids a 50 percent
chance of being forced to pass up investment with an NPV of 20. You could say
that putting 100 in the bank at t = -1 has an ex ante NPV of 10.
Discussion
The conventional rationale for holding financial slack--cash, liquid
assets, or unused borrowing power--is that the firm doesn't want to have to
issue stock on short notice in order to pursue a valuable investment
opportunity. Managers point to the red tape, delays and underwriting costs
encountered in stock issues. They also typically say, "We don't want to be
forced to issue stock when our firm is undervalued by the market."
A financial economist might respond by asking, "Managers may have superior
information, but why should that be a disadvantage? If we admit that the firm
is sometimes undervalued, then sometimes it must be overvalued. Why can't
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firms take advantage of the market by issuing securities only when the firm is
overpriced?"
Our examples suggest answers for these questions: slack has value because
without it the firm is sometimes unwilling to issue stock and therefore passes
up a good investment opportunity. Slack does not allow the firm to take
advantage of investors by issuing only when stock is overvalued: if investors
know the firm does not have to issue to invest, then an attempt to issue sends
a strong pessimistic signal.
Slack is clearly unnecessary if the firm has a "private line" to existing
stockholders. However, private communication to old stockholders would be
difficult and also illegal. Slack is also unnecessary if the firm can compel
its old stockholders to buy and hold the new issue; in this case, the conflict
between old and new stockholders does not exist.
Our examples suggest that slack allows the firm to avoid external
financing, and thereby to avoid entangling its investment decisions in
possible conflicts of interest between old and new shareholders.6 Slack
therefore allows the firm to avoid the consequences of managers' inside
information. Unfortunately, this conclusion is not as neat as it appears at
first, for it rests on assuming that old stockholders are passive, and do not
rebalance their portfolios when they learn whether the firm invests. If they
do rebalance, conflicts of interest between old and new shareholders occur
even if the firm has ample slack. We return to this point in Section 3.
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Information Costs
The value of slack disappears if the firm can costlessly convey its
special knowledge to all investors, new as well as old. One way to justify
our contrary assumption is to think of cases in which values depend on
proprietary information which, if released to the market, would be released to
competitors also, consequently reducing either the value of its
asset-in-place, the NPV of its investment opportunity, or both.
The firm cannot convey that information by saying, "We have great
prospects, but we can't tell you the details." In our model, the firm always
has the incentive to do this, so such statements carry no information. The
firm has to supply verifiable detail sufficient to indicate the true state of
nature. The costs of supplying, absorbing and verifying this information may
be significant. Yet making it public will in most cases tell the firm's
competitors all they want to know.7
There can also be information asymmetries when there is no need to guard
proprietary information. Educating investors takes time and money. After
all, the managers' information advantage goes beyond having more facts than
investors do. Managers also know better what those facts mean for the firm.
They have an insider's view of their organization and what it can and cannot
do. This organizational knowledge is part of managers' human capital; they
acquire it as they work, by conscious effort as well as by trial and error.
An outside investor who tried to match an equally intelligent manager on this
dimension would probably fail. By this argument, the separation of ownership
from professional management naturally creates asymmetric information.
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Related Work
Our problem is similar to the one addressed by Akerlof (1970), who showed
how markets can break down when potential buyers cannot verify the quality of
the product they are offered. Faced with the risk of buying a lemon, the
buyer will demand a discount, which in turn discourages the potential sellers
who do not have lemons. However, in our paper, the seller is not offering a
single good, but a partial claim on two, the asset-in-place and the new
project. Moreover, the seller gives up one of them (the new project) if the
partial claim is not sold. Without this more complex structure, we would have
little to say, beyond noting that securities can be lemons too.
Akerlof's paper was one of the first investigations of the economics of
unevenly distributed information. The assumption of asymmetric information
underlies extensive recent work on agency costs, signalling, adverse
selection, etc. A detailed review of all that is not needed here. However,
several articles are directly relevant to our problem:
1. Campbell (1979) assumes that firms have proprietary information that
would be costly to convey to the market. He describes the resulting financing
difficulties and possible remedies. His main point is to provide a new
rationale for debt financing through financial intermediaries. It may, for
example, be possible to reveal proprietary information to a bank without
revealing it to competitors; the bank could then finance a new project on
terms which are fair to old stockholders. This line of analysis is further
explored in Campbell and Kracaw (1980).
However, Campbell does not consider what happens if a firm with
proprietary information does attempt a public issue. He presents no formal
equilibrium model of security pricing and of the financing and investment
III
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decisions of the firm.
2. Leland and Pyle (1977) consider an entrepreneur seeking additional
equity financing for a single venture. The entrepreneur knows the project's
expected return but outside investors do not. However, the outside investors
observe the fraction of the entrepreneur's personal wealth committed to the
project, and set their valuation accordingly. The greater the entrepreneur's
willingness to take a personal stake in the project, the more investors are
willing to pay for their share of it.
This suggests a possible extension to our model. If managers also are
(old) stockholders, then managers' inside information may be conveyed by the
amount of the new issue they are willing to buy for their personal portfolios.
3. Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983) pose a problem similar to ours, but end
up pursuing a different issue. We fix the extent of managers' inside
information and examine the equilibrium issue-investment decision. They ask
how much information the firm should reveal, assuming that each revelation
provides information to competitors as well as investors, and therefore
reduces the value of the firm. They show that the firm may be able to convey
its true value to investors without revealing everything its competitors would
like to know. However, their search for signalling equilibria carries them a
long way from this paper's analysis.
4. Rendleman (1980) also sets a problem similar to ours. His investors
may over- or undervalue the firm's assets or investment opportunities or
misassess its risk. He focuses on the choice between debt and equity
financing, but does not derive a full equilibrium model. For example, he
shows that undervalued firms will typically prefer debt, but does not model
the market's response to the firm's choice of debt over equity. In general
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management's choice of financing must convey information about the firm's
intrinsic value and actual risk. In our model however, the firm never issues
equity when it has the option to issue debt, regardless of whether the firm is
over- or undervalued. We prove this later in the paper.
5. Giammarino and Neave (1982) present a model in which the' firm and
investors have different perceptions of the risk--e.g., variance--of the
return on an investment opportunity, but agree on the mean return. They
concentrate on the choice among financing instruments, and develop a rationale
for convertibles. Our model is in most respects more general, since we allow
different information about any aspect of the distributions of asset values.
However, we do not consider convertibles as such. We have further comments on
these authors' results in Section 3.
6. Miller and Rock (1982) present a model of dividend policy under
asymmetric information. If the amount of investment and external financing is
held fixed, the cash dividend paid by the firm reveals its operating cash
flow. Thus, a larger-than-expected dividend reveals larger-than-expected cash
flow, and stock price increases. A larger-than-expected external financing
reveals lower-than-expected cash flow, which is bad news for investors. Thus
Miller and Rock's model predicts that announcements of new security issues
will, on average, depress stock price. So does our model, as we will show in
Section 2. However, ours also yields more specific hypotheses about what
kinds of securities firms choose to issue and how that choice affects the
magnitude of the stock price change. These issues, and the relevant empirical
evidence, are discussed further in Section 3.
7. There are other theoretical papers exploring how managers' inside
information is signalled to investors. They include Bhattacharya's work on
III
-19-
dividend policy (1979), Grossman and Hart's (1981) work on takeover bids, and
Ross's papers on "financial incentive signalling" (1977,1978), in which a
manger's employment contract leads him to convey information about the firm's
prospects through a choice of its capital structure. There are also tempting
analogies between our paper and the literature on credit rationing. See, for
example, Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
2. THE FORMAL MODEL
In this section, we give a formal statement and solution of the model
introduced in Section 1. We assume 0 < S < I so that some or all of the
project must be financed by a stock issue. By varying slack S, we vary the
size of the required issue, E - I - S.
If the firm, knowing the true values a and b, does not issue, it
forfeits the investment opportunity, so V° ld S + a. The slack remains in
cash or liquid assets. If it does issue and invest, E - I - S and
old P'
Vold (E + S + a + b)P'+E
Old stockholders are better off (or will be at t - +1) if the firm issues
only when
S + a p+ (E + S + a + b)
or when
E P'
E (S + a) < (E + b)PI,+ E P + b
UUb_____ll__ll_II·__-___-
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Share of existing Share of increment
assets and slack < to firm value obtained
going to new by old stockholders
stockholders
The condition can also be written:
(E/P')(S + a) < E + b . (1)
Thus the line
(E/P')(S + a) = E + b (la)
divides the joint probability distribution of and into two regions,
as shown in Figure 1. If the actual outcome (a, b) falls in region M', the
firm issues and invests. If the outcome falls in region M, the firm does
nothing: it is willing to give up the NPV of its investment opportunity
rather than sell shares for less than the shares are really worth. (Figure 2
displays the numerical example presented above in the format of Figure 1.)
Remember that the joint probability distribution of a and b is
restricted to the Northeast quadrant of Figure 1. Region M' is at the tp
left of this quadrant. The firm is most likely to issue when b, the
realization of project NPV, is high and a, the realization of value of the
asset-in-place, is low. The higher b is, the more old stockholders gain
from issuing and investing. The lower a is, the more attractive the issue
price P'.
Of course P' itself depends on the probability densities of (X,) in
the regions M and M', and the boundaries of M and M' depend on P'.
Thus P', M and M' are simultaneously determined. The stock issue will be
fairly priced to investors if
P' = S + A(M') + B(M') (2)
b, Net present value of
investment opportunity
Region M'
(Issue and Invest)
E +b - Ep (S+o)
Region M
(Do Nothing)
Fig. 1: The issue-investment decision when managers know more than
investors about the value of the firm's assets in place (a)
and the net present value of its investment opportunities (b).
The firm issues stock only if (a,b) falls in region M'. E
is the amount of new equity required to finance the investment,
P' the equilibrium value of the firm conditional on issue, and
S is the amount of financial slack (financing available from
internal sources).
I
P' I
_I
I
b, Net present value
of investment opportunity
Region M'
(Issue and invest)
State 2:
a 50
b 10
0k
+ 00
I60100+b- a a
Region M
(Do nothing)
State I 
a=150
b= 20
.
+150 +200
P' 60
I/E 100
-00 (EIl-S- 100-0)
Fig. 2: Solution for Example 2 from Section 2. In this case, the firm
issues and invests in state 1, when assets in place are worth
50 and the net present value of the investment opportunity is
10--i.e., where (a,b)=(50,10). It does not issue or invest
in state 2, where (a,b)=(150,20). The states are assumed
equally probable. Firm value conditional on issue is P'=60.
t 150
+100
+50
-50
)lace
- '26b 
-21-
where AM') EaIE = I - S) and B(M') EIE = I - S). These
expectations reflect only the information available to investors: the
distribution of and and the decision to issue, which tells
investors that the true values a and b satisfy Inequality (1).
Properties of Equilibrium
These equilibrium conditions imply that the firm may pass up good
opportunities rather than selling stock to raise funds. This occurs with
probability F(M). The ex ante loss in value is L F(M)B(M), There is
no loss when the firm has sufficient slack to finance the investment--that is,
L 0 when S > I. If on the other hand, S < I, as we will assume in
the following discussion, the ex ante loss increases as E, the size of the
required equity issue, increases. Since E = I - S, the loss also increases
with the required investment I and decreases with slack available S.
Special cases. "Corner solutions," in which the firm always issues stock
or never issues stock, are rarely encountered in this model given
reasonable joint probability distributions for I and. . This occurs
because both and are random and have positive means, and because the
investment decision cannot be postponed. The following-special cases do give
corner solutions, however. First, if a is known by investors as well as
managers, then stock is always issued when b > 0, and thus
L = 0. To show this, first substitute a for A(M') in Equation (2)
ilr III_ ______
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P' - S + a + B(M')
Since B(M') > O, P' > S + a. The firm will issue stock if
E ( S + a ) < E + b
This condition mu t be sat sfied, because (S + a)/P' < 
This condition must be satisfied, because (S + a)/P' < 1 and b > 0.
The firm will issue whenever the investment opportunity has zero or positive
NPV (b > 0). The market value of the old stockholders' stake in the
firm, conditional on issue, is therefore P' = S + a + B.
In our model, asymmetric information restricted to investment
opportunities never prevents a stock issue. The terms of sale may be
favorable to the firm (if b < B) or unfavorable (if b > B), but even in
the latter case the firm is better off issuing than losing the project
entirely.
This suggests that some firms would be better off splitting assets in
place away from growth opportunities. For example, if the asset-in-place can
be sold for a, without affecting b, then the problems addressed in this
paper evaporate.l0 If the investment opportunity has zero or positive NPV
(b > 0), then the firm sells the asset-in-place. If the proceeds cover the
investment required (a > I), it goes ahead. However, it also goes ahead.
if a < I, because selling the asset-in-place reveals its true value. As we
have just shown, asymmetric information restricted to investment opportunities
never prevents a stock issue.ll
On the other hand, the firm might simply spin off its asset-in-place as a
separately-financed company. In our model, stockholders are better off ex
ante holding two firms rather than one, providing that the spinoff does not
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reduce the values of the distributions and/or .
Now consider the case in which the firm has no investment opportunities
(B 0 in all states of the world). Here things break down totally: 12
stock is never issued, except possibly when a is at a definite lower bound.
Let ai n denote the lower bound: assume that both investors and the firm
know that a cannot be less than a i n . (Note we have reintroduced
asymmetric information about a.) Then P' cannot be less than ai n + S,
because everyone would then know the firm's shares were underpriced. But
P' > amin + S can also be ruled out, for it leads to a contradiction. To
see why, substitute P' amin + S + e in Inequality (1). With e > 0,
the firm issues only if a < amin + e. Therefore, A(M') < amin + e,
and P' > S + A(M'), which violates Equation (2).
So the only possibility for P' when b - 0 is P' amin + S. In
that case, the firm only issues when a amin. It never issues when
a > amin, because then:
( p, ) > E,
which violates Inequality (1).
If b is positive and investors know its value, the firm will issue and
invest in at least some states where a > amin
.
It may issue in all
states--that is, if b is large enough, it may issue even if a is far out
on the right hand tail of its distribution.
One insight of this model is that you need asymmetric information about
both assets in place and investment opportunities to get interesting
solutions. For example, without asymmetric information about assets in place,
 
___
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stock is always issued when the firm haS a positvl -NPV opportunity;
asymmetric information does not affect real investment -decisions.
The impact of stock issues on stock price. In our model, the decision to
issue stock always reduces stock price, unless the issue is a foregone
conclusion. That is equivalent to saying that P' < P if the probability
of issue is less than 1.0. (Note that this rules out the "corner solution"
in which investors know what managers know about the value of assets in
place.) If the firm is sure to issue, then the issue conveys no information,
and P' = P.
The proof is simple. Note that P = A(M) + S, the expected value of
assets in place and slack conditional on not issuing, or in other words,
conditional on the realizations a and b falling in region M in Figure
1. Assume M is not empty--there is some probability of no issue. Then a
glance at Figure 1 shows that all realizations of a which fall in M
exceed P' - S, and A(M) must exceed P'- S. Since P - S = A(M),
P - S > P' - S, and P > P'.
Or look at it this way: the reason a firm diecides not to issue is that
a > P'(1 + b/E) - S. (This follows from reversing and ,reatranging. -
Inequality (1).) Since b/E > 0, the decision not to issue signals
a > P' - S or a + S > P'. In other'wrds,; it signals that; the true
value of slack and assets in place exceed P', the price of the "old" shares
if new shares are issued. Since P A(M) + S P must exceed P'-, and price
must fall when the issue-invest decision is revealed.
Note that both P and P' incorporate 'iil infdrmat~in available to
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investors. They are rationally-formed, unbiased estimates of the firm's
intrinsic value. They reflect knowledge of the firm's decision rule as well
as its decision. P exceeds P' because investors rationally interpret the
decision not to issue as good news about the true value of the firm.L 3
Comment. Why should stock issues always convey bad news? Might not
investors view some issues as confirming the existence of a positive-NPV
opportunity? That ought to be good news, not bad.
We will now explain why our model rules out this optimistic response.
do so requires a bit of backtracking, however.
To
We have assumed that , the NPV of the firm's investment opportunity at
t = 0, is nonnegative. Negative-NPV investments ( < 0) would never be
undertaken. Even if the firm encountered a negative-NPV investment and raised
sufficient money to undertake it, it would never go ahead. It would put the
money in the bank instead, or into some other zero-NPV investment. (It can
buy other firms' shares, for example.) Thus, the distribution of I is
truncated at ' 0.
There may, however, be a high probability that the realization b will be
exactly zero. What does the firm do when this happens (when b = 0)?
Answer: it follows the rule stated above, issuing if:
(E/P')(S + a) < E + b (1)
or, with b = 0, if P' > S + a or a < P' - S. In Figure 1, the points
(a,b) for which b = 0 and a < P' - S lie on the horizontal axis to the
left of the line separating regions M and M'. In other words, M'
includes (its share of) the horizontal axis.
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Since the firm issues whenever (a,b) falls in region M', even when it has
only zero-NPV opportunities, the decision to issue does not signal
"positive-NPV investment" but only "Region M'." We have already shown that
the rational investor reaction to Region M' is "bad news."
This does not imply that the firm will always issue when it has no
positive-NPV opportunity (b 0). It issues only when the value of its
assets in place is low enough to make the issue attractive-i.e., when
a < P' - S. Moreover, the higher the probability that b 0, other things
14
equal, the lower P', and the lower the probability of issue. In the
limit, when b > 0 is ruled out entirely, the firm will never issue, except
possibly when the realization of a falls at a definite lower bound. (This
is one of the corner solutions discussed above.)
The intuition that stock issues confirm the existence of positive-NPV
projects must therefore be rejected if our model is right. That intuition
might be borne out if managers could commit to refrain from issuing when
b - 0, but this is not a credible policy if managers act in the old
shareholders' interests.
Numerical Solutions
The analysis presented so far establishes that the firm may rationally
forego a valuable investment opportunity if common stock must be issued to
finance it. We would also like to have some indication of the probability of
this event and the magnitude of the ex ante loss in firm value. For that we
have to turn numerical methods.
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The key to a numerical solution is of course P': once we know it, we can
use Equation (2) to separate regions M' and M. Unfortunately, we cannot
guarantee a unique P'-it depends on the joint probability distribution of
a and b.15 Nor can we give a more specific analytical expression for P',
although calculating P' by numerical methods is not difficult. The method
we have used is:
1. Start by setting P' = S + A + B. This assumes the firm always issues
stock if b > 0.
2. Then determine the regions M and M' assuming the firm faces this
trial value for P' and acts in the old stockholders' interest.
3. Calculate a new trial value of P' = S + A(M') + B(M') based on the
regions M and M' from step 2.
4. Continue until P' converges.
This procedure gives the highest equilibrium P'. In our numerical experiments
this value has always been a unique solution for joint lognormal distributions
of A and B, and also forJoint normal distributions truncated to exclude
negative X's and 's.
Table 1 illustrates the results obtained in extensive numerical
experiments.l6 It shows L, loss in market value at t -1, as
a percent of B, the average NPV of the investment opportunity. It also
shows F(M'), the probability the firm will issue stock and invest.
and are assumed joint lognormally distributed and slack is varied
from zero to the required investment I. Note that:
a. Increasing slack reduces L/B and increases F(M').
b. Increasing project NPV (B/I) reduces L/B.
__l__p___·_________1111___1___1__ -- -----
Expected ex ante losses in firm value when the value of assets
in place () and the net present value of investment
opportunities (9) are lognormally distributed. A and B
are assumed independently distributed, with expectations
= 100 and B = 1 or 10, and standard deviations oA = 10
or 100 and oB = 10. The probability distributions reflect
information available to investors before the firm reveals
whether it will issue and invest. The investment required is
I = 10 or 100. Financial slack, S, is varied between 0 and
100 percent of I. The losses are expressed as a percent of B.
The probability that the firm will issue is given in parentheses.
Source: Majluf (1978), Table 4, p. 167 and Table 6, p. 169.
Table 1:
I = 10 I 100
S B/
OA-10 oA=100 OA-10 aA-100
99.8 100- 98.5 99.9
.01 (0.1) (0+) (1.2) (0.1)
17.8 97.8 2.8 68.8
(68.4) (1.6) (94.1) (28.0)
94.1 100- 68.7 97.1
(3.2) (0+) (21.7) (2.1)
50
5.1 84.4 0.4 39.4
(87.0) (11.2) (98.6) (51.7)
19.9 97.0 5.7 65.0
(65.2) (1.9) (85.8) (25.9)
90
0.1 18.7 0+ 5.1
.10 (99.5) (70.5) (100-) (89.6)
.01 0 0 0 0
(0) (0) (0) (0)100
0 0 0 0
(0) (0) (0) (0)
III
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c. Reducing the standard deviation of assets in place aA
reduces the loss in value. (We showed above that L 0 when
a A0.)
We also experimented with the standard deviation of B and the
correlation of and B, but found no uniform effects.
Debt Financing
So far, we have assumed that the firm can raise external funds only by
issuing stock. Now we will adapt the model to include the choice between debt
and equity issues.
If the firm can issue default-risk free debt, our problem disappears: the
firm never passes up a positive-NPV investment. If it can only issue risky
debt, our problem is only alleviated: the firm sometimes passes up
positive-NPV investments, but the average opportunity loss is less with debt
than with equity financing. The general rule seems to be: better to issue
safe securities than risky ones.
This requires more careful discussion. Assume the money needed for the
investment opportunity (I - S) can be financed by debt, D, or equity, E.
Assume for the moment that these are two distinct policies announced at
t -1 and adhered to in t 0. That is, the firm must choose debt or
equity before managers know the true values a and b.
The firm issues and invests if V , the intrinsic value of the old
stockholders' equity, is higher with the issue than without it. If it does
issue, V equals total firm value less the value of the newly-issued
securities.
____1__1_____1_^_I___ _____
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Suppose equity is issued. Then Void a + b + I - E, where E1
is the newly issued shares' market value at t +1, when investors learn a
and b. The issue price of these shares is just E - I - S at t 0. Thus
V°old S + a + b - (E1 - E) - S + a + b -AE; AE is the new
shareholders' capital gain or loss when the truth comes out at t +1,
conditional on the firm's issue of shares at t 0.
The firm will issue and invest only if
S + a< S + a + b - AE (3)
or if b > tE. The investment's NPV must equal or exceed the capital gain
on newly-issued shares. (Note: AE may be positive or negative. At
equilibrium investors expect it to be zero. The firm knows the true value.)
If debt is issued, we follow exactly the same argument, with D and
D1 substituted for E and E1 , and reach the same conclusion: the firm
will issue and invest only if b equals or exceeds AD- D1 - D. Of
course if the debt is default-risk free, AD = 0,7 and the firm always
issues and invests when b > 0. Thus, the ability to issue risk-free debt
is as good as financial slack. If the debt is not default risk-free, AD
may be positive or negative. Option pricing theory tells us that AD will
have the same sign as AE, but that its absolute value will always be
18less. We so assume for the moment.
Now compare the issue-invest decisions for debt vs. equity financing.
Since b> 0, the firm will always invest when AD and E are zero or
negative. Suppose AD and AE are positive (good news in store for
investors at t +1). If the firm is willing to issue equity and invest, it
is-also willing to issue debt (AD < E, so b > AE implies
b > AD). However, debt is issued in some states where equity is not
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(AD < b < AE). Thus, the ex ante value of the firm is higher under
the debt-financing policy, because the loss in market value (L) due to
under-investment is less.
Now suppose the choice of debt or equity is not preannounced, but chosen
at t 0, after the firm knows the values a and b. This seems a more
complicated problem, for the choice could give an additional signal to
investors. It's tempting to say the overvalued firm would issue equity and
the undervalued firm debt.1 9
In our model, however, the firm never issues equity. If it issues and
invests, it always issues debt, regardless of whether the firm is over- or
undervalued. A proof follows.
The payoff to old stockholders (V° ld ) if neither debt or equity is
issued is a + S. The additional payoffs to issuing and investing are b -
AE with equity financing and b - AD with debt financing. An equity
issue therefore signals that b - AE > b - AD, that is AE < AD.
Remember that AE and AD are the gains realized by new stock or
bondholders at t = +1 when the firm's true value is revealed. They depend
on a,b,S and the decision to issue and invest. If there is an equilibrium
in which equity is issued, there is a price PE at which investors can
rationally expect AE = 0. For debt, the equilibrium firm value is
PD and investors expect AD = 0. Given a,b and S, AE and
AD have the same sign, but IAEl > IADI
However, there is no equilibrium price PE at which the firm can
issue stock. It prefers stock to debt only if PE is high enough that
AE < AD. This occurs only if AE < 0, implying a sure capital loss
for new stockholders. Therefore, there can be no price PE at which
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(1) the firm is willing to issue stock rather than debt and (2) investors are
willing to buy.
To put it another way: suppose the firm announced at t - -1 that it
would issue debt if it issued any security. It could not change its mind and
issue equity at t 0, because investors would assume this meant E < 0
and refuse to buy. On the other hand, a firm which announced a policy of
equity financing at t -1 would be forced to change its mind, and to issue
debt at t - 0 if it issued at all. Equity would be issued at t ' 0 only
if absolutely ruled out at t - 1; yet we showed above that precommitting to
equity financing is always inferior to precommitting to debt.
Thus, our model may explain why many firms seem to prefer internal
financing to financing by security issues and, when they do issue, why they
seem to prefer bonds to stock. This has been interpreted as managerial
capitalism--an attempt by managers to avoid the discipline of capital markets
and to cut the ties that bind managers' to stockholders' interests. In our
model, this behavior is in the stockholders' interest.
Equity Issues in Asymmetric Information Models
The chief difficulty with this analysis of the debt-equity choice is that
we end up leaving no room at all for stock issues. We could of course
recreate a role for them by introducing agency or bankruptcy costs of debt, as
discussed in, for example, Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), and Smith
and Warner (1979). But it is also possible to rationalize equity issues in
models based on information asymmetries alone.
Our proof that debt dominates equity uses the standard option-pricing
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assumption that percentage changes in value are lognormally distributed with a
constant variance rate known by everyone. However, suppose there is a large
information asymmetry about the (future) variance rate. If investors
underestimate the variance rate, the firm will be tempted to issue debt, but
if they overestimate it, the firm will be tempted to issue equity, other
things equal. Thus, a decision to issue equity may not signal a sure capital
loss for new stockholders, but simply that the firm is safer than prospective
bondholders think. Thus equity issues are not completely ruled out in
equilibrium.
Giammarino and Neave (1982) set up a model in which the managers and
investors share the same information about everything except risk. In this
case, equity issues dominate debt issues, because the only time the firm wants
to issue debt is when they know the firm is riskier than investors think.
Investors, realizing this, refuse to buy. Only equity, or perhaps a
convertible security, is issued in equilibrium.
Firms actually seem to favor debt over equity issues, not the reverse. We
believe asymmetric information about firm value is a stronger determinant of
financing behavior than asymmetric information about risk, and we will so
assume in subsequent comments, although future empirical research could of
course prove us wrong. On the theoretical side, an obvious next step is to
analyze the debt-equity choice in a version of our model which explicitly
allows information asymmetry on the two dimensions of firm value and firm
20
variance.
___1~_·1_~__1^~1~____D_~··-···lVI ~ --- II----~
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3. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT MANAGEMENT'S OBJECTIVES
We have shown that ample financial slack allows the firm to avoid external
financing and to disentangle investment decisions from conflicts of interest
between old stockholders and new investors. However, this result depends on
management's acting in the interest of passive stockholders. We will now
consider how rational stockholders react to the firm's investment decision.
We show that, in frictionless capital markets, their reaction does not depend
on whether the investment is financed with internal or external funds.
The Irrelevance of Financing
Take the simplest case, in which the firm can only issue stock. When the
firm has inadequate slack (S < I), we showed that the firm may pass up
valuable investment opportunities. This loss would be avoided if old
stockholders could be compelled to buy and hold the new issue--in other words,
to accept the new asset in their own portfolios. In general, this will not be
their optimal portfolio strategy, however, so new shareholders enter, creating
the conflict.
Now suppose the firm has ample slack (S > I). Old stockholders arrive
at t 0 with shares representing a portfolio of three items: an asset in
place, a growth opportunity and cash. If the growth opportunity is taken, the
cash vanishes, and the portfolio changes to two assets in place. The old
stockholders "buy" all of the new asset via the firm's internal financing.
However, there is nothing to force them to hold it. The same portfolio
motives that would prevent them from buying all of a new issue should prompt
them to sell part of their shares if the firm uses its cash to buy a risky
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real asset.
There is no deadweight loss so long as the firm buys this asset whenever
it has positive NPV (b > 0). However, suppose managers start to worry
about the price old shareholders trade at when they rebalance their portfolios
after an internally-financed investment is made. Table 2 sets out equilibrium
conditions for this case. The left-hand block (Case I) shows old
shareholders' payoffs if the firm has no slack. We assume old shareholders
could buy all of the new issue. Therefore, we earmark C = I dollars of cash
and other securities and take it as potentially available for investment.
However, their optimal portfolio calls for investing aI in the new issue.
The resulting equilibrium conditions are slight generalizations of those given
in Section 2 above (we previously took a - 0).
In the right-hand block (Case II), the firm holds the same amount of cash
on behalf of old shareholders. If the firm invests this cash, they recoup
part of it by selling shares to raise (1 - a)I. Their fractional ownership
thus ends up as (P" - (1 - a)I)/P". Note that P", the market price of the
firm conditional on investment, includes the investment I. It's convenient
to substitute P _ P" - I.
net
At equilibrium, P net A(M") + B(M"), where M" indicates the
states in which investment by the firm is in the old shareholders' interest
given the price Pnet facing them when they sell.
The equilibrium conditions for the two cases shown in Table 2 are
identical. The firm's investment decision is independent of whether cash
starts out in the shareholders' bank accounts or the firm's. The firm passes
up good investment opportunities in the same states, so the ex ante loss L
is the same for the two cases. So are the market prices conditional on
1_ -I--1I^1 ·nlil··.-n-i·I-----------
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the decision to invest: P' P
The choice between debt and equity financing should not matter either.
Suppose the starting position is Case I in Table 2. The firm borrows C I
dollars from its stockholders. That transforms Case I into II, if the debt is
default-risk free. The final equilibrium investment decision and stock price
are unaffected.
If the debt carries default risk, old shareholders are exposed to the
firm's business risk through their new debt securities as well as their
stock. Therefore, when the firm invests, they will raise (1 - a)I by
selling a mixture of debt and equity securities--the same fraction of their
holdings of each. However, the same final equilibrium is reached again.
If the risky debt is sold to outsiders, old shareholders would buy part of
the debt issue, and sell some of their shares. However, as long as capital
markets are frictionless, and all traders understand what is going on, the
final result is the same.
We thus obtain an (MM) proposition of financial irrelevance, where all the
action comes from the firm's decision to invest. If this tack is taken, our
model's empirical implications change. We could not explain firms' demand for
slack, their apparent preference for internal financing, or for debt over
equity issues. A fall in stock price on announcement of a stock issue would
be explained as an information effect. That is, the issue would not matter in
itself, but only as a signal of the decision to invest.
However, before we turn to the empirical evidence, we will devote a few
more words to the competing descriptions of management objectives and
shareholder responses when managers know more than shareholders do.
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Ex Ante Optimal Policies
Old shareholders are better off ex ante, and on average ex post, if
management takes all positive-NPV projects. Perhaps compensation packages
have features that prompt managers to follow this rule. Social conventions or
corporate cultures that encourage managers to maximize "long-run value" may
have the same effect. Also, following the rule may be in managers'
self-interest: a manager who does not allow conflicts between old and new
shareholders' interests to block positive-NPV projects could demand a higher
salary ex ante than one who does.
However, management must take some responsibility for financing. Consider
the extreme instruction, "Take all positive-NPV projects and issue securities
at any price."
The "wrong" price for a security issue does not affect firm value. It
just transfers value from some securityholders to others. Nevertheless, the
instruction is not credible. Public stockholders would not support it,
because it would leave them unprotected against sweet deals given to insiders
or their friends.
Of course this sort of sweet deal is illegal. An outside investor hurt by
one of them could sue, and probably win if the mispricing were obvious and the
motive clear. The law requires a manager to worry about the terms of
financing; we think it encourages the manager to look at financing from the
viewpoint of the passive investor.
Consider the altered instructions, "Take all positive-NPV projects, and
issue securities at a fair price conditional on market information only." In
other words, managers should use their special information on the demand side,
but ignore it when it comes to financing. However, these instructions are
III
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still not fully credible, not only because of the mental discipline required,
but also because managers' personal interests are likely to be more closely
aligned with old stockholders' interests than with new stockholders'.
Consider a manager who is also a stockholder. If he always buys and holds
a pro rata share of any new issue, and maximizes the intrinsic value of his
holdings, then his interests will be aligned with all securityholders', and he
will maximize the intrinsic value of the firm.
However, most managers would not want to buy a pro rata share of every new
issue, even if the issue is fairly priced from their point of view. The
reasons why can be traced to the same portfolio considerations which prevent
old stockholders from buying all of every new issue--loss of diversification
and, in extreme cases, limits to personal wealth. If the manager does not buy
all of every new issue then his interests as a shareholder are those of an
(informed) old shareholder.
There is still another complication: a manager-shareholder who has inside
information will be tempted to trade on it. If the outside market is
(semi-strong form) efficient, the manager will want to sell half the time and
buy the other half. In particular, he will want to abstain from half of new
issues, and buy more than a pro rata share of the others. He will also want
to buy or sell if the firm does not issue. The potential trading profit will
depend on the issue-invest decision, although apparently not in any tractable
way. We doubt the managers' interests will be aligned with any outside
investor's if the managers are given free rein to trade on personal account.
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Empirical Evidence
It is easy to see why managers should take all positive-NPV projects, but
hard to build a completely convincing theory explaining why they would always
do so. We think it more likely that managers having superior information act
in old stockholders' interest. We also think that existing empirical evidence
supports our view.
If management acts in old shareholders' interests, our model predicts that
the decision to issue and invest causes stock price to fall. If management
took all and only positive-NPV projects, even when issuing and investing
reduces the intrinsic value of the "old" shares, the same decision would
either increase stock price or leave it unchanged. The decision to invest
would reveal the existence of an attractive project (i.e., b > 0). This is
good news, unless investors knew for sure that the firm would have that
investment opportunity. It cannot be bad news in any case.
Recent papers by Dann and Mikkelson (1982), Korwar (1982), and Asquith and
Mullins (1983) show significant negative average price impacts when a new
stock issue is announced. "Information effects" are an obvious explanation.
However, as far as we know, ours is the only complete model explaining how
such an information effect could occur in a rational expectations equilibrium.
Of course our model predicts that stock prices will always fall when
investors learn of a new stock issue. But the model holds everything but the
issue-investment decision constant. In particular, it ignores the flow to
investors of other information about the firm's prospects. This flow creates
a random error in any measurement of how a stock price changes in response to
a specific event.
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If our interpretation of these results is accepted, we can set aside, at
least for the present discussion, models assuming managers simply "accept all
positive-NPV projects."
If managers act in old shareholders' interests, do they assume those
shareholders are passive or active? Do they just maximize the existing
shares' value, or do they work out how rational shareholders' portfolio
choices depend on their decisions?
These questions can also be answered empirically. If managers assume
active shareholders, then only the investment decision matters. Good
investments are foregone even when the firm has plenty of cash to pay for
them. However, if managers assume passive stockholders, then financing
matters and firms will adapt their financing policy to mitigate the loss in
value from foregone investment opportunities. For example, managers will try
to build up financial slack on order to avoid situations in which a security
issue is required to finance a valuable investment opportunity. If
information asymmetries relate primarily to firm value, rather than risk,
managers will favor debt over equity financing if external capital is required.
In our framework, the "passive investor" assumption gives a variety of
interesting hypotheses about corporate financing. That is why we use the
assumption for most of this paper's formal analysis.
We noted that Dann and Mikkelson (1982) found a significant negative
average price impact when stock issues are announced. They also looked at a
sample of debt issues, and found no significant price impact. Our model may
be able to explain this difference. 25
The "passive investor" assumption implies that stock price falls when
stock is issued. However, stock price should not fall if default risk-free
__11__1___1_1__1_1____111_1_1____- -
-40-
debt is issued, because the ability to issue risk-free debt is equivalent to
having ample financial slack, and having ample slack insures that the firm
will take all positive-NPV projects. Thus, in our model the only information
conveyed by the decision to issue risk-free debt and invest is that the firm
has a positive-NPV project. This causes a positive price change unless the
project's existence was known beforehand.
Under the "active investor" assumption, the decision to invest would be
bad news, and the choice of debt over equity financing would not make the news
any better. Choosing this assumption would give us no way to explain Dann and
Mikkelson's results.
Of course, the debt issues examined by Dann and Mikkelson were not
literally default-risk free. But if the probability of default on these
issues was small, their negative "information effect" should likewise be
small.26
4. EXTENSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Having explained our model formally, and having discussed its assumptions
and some of its empirical implications, we can now turn to a few extensions,
qualifications, and further observations.27 We specifically address two
questions:
1. What happens when the information asymmetry is temporary? What
happens when it is permanent but the firm has no immediate need for funds,
except to build up slack?
2. What does our model say about mergers?
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Discussing these questions leads us to other issues, for example, the
implications of managers' superior information for dividend policy.
An Easy Way Out
There is of course an easy way out of the problems described in this
paper--an easy way to avoid any loss of market value: just issue stock at
t = -1, when managers and the market are assumed to share the same
information. That is one lesson of our model. If managers know more than the
market does, firms should avoid situations in which valuable investment
projects have to be financed by stock issues. Having slack solves the
problem, and one way to get slack is to issue stock when there is no
asymmetric information.
That is not an easy way out, however, if the information asymmetry is
permanent. Suppose managers are always one period ahead of the
market. At t = -1, for example, managers would know A and B, but
investors would not. Investors at t = -1 would see A and B as
random variables. At t = 0, they would find out the means A and B
(and the underlying distributions of I and ) but by that time
managers would know the realizations a and b.
Assume the firm has insufficient slack to undertake the project, and
also, to keep things simple, that the amount of slack is fixed unless
equity is issued to increase it and the investment required to undertake
the project is known. Consider the decision to issue E = I - S dollars
of stock at t = -1. If the firm does not issue, its true value at
t = -1 is
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VOld(no issue) =A + B + S - L
where L is the ex ante loss in firm value attributable to insufficient
slack. That is, L reflects the probability the firm will choose to
pass up a positive-NPV investment at t = 0, and the loss in value if it
does. Of course, investors do not know how big L is, because they do
not know the distributions of I and 3. However, they do know that L
goes to zero if the firm issues stock at t -1 in order to raise the
additional cash E I - S needed to assure investment at t 0.
This brings us back to the same problem we started with in Section
1. We have an "asset-in-place" worth A + B + S - L and an "investment
opportunity" worth L. Managers know these values but investors have only
probability distributions. Thus, the firm's decision to issue and the price
investors are willing to pay are governed by Inequality (1) and Equation (2).
Managers may or may not issue stock at t -1: it depends on the price they
can issue it for. If investors are too pessimistic, relative to what managers
know, managers may accept the ex ante loss L and take a chance that the firm
will be able to issue and invest at t = 0 if the NPV of its investment
opportunity turns out positive.
We will not here pursue analysis of the optimal issue strategy in this
dynamic setting. However, we have shown that the problems addressed in this
paper do not go away when the firm has no immediate real investment
opportunity. Given asymmetric information, a firm with valuable future real
investment opportunities is better off with slack than without it. Moreover,
III
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it should build up slack through retention rather than stock issues. This is
consistent with actual retention policies of most public firms, which limit
dividends so that they will rarely have to go to the market for fresh equity.
Thus we add one item in favor of the list of possible arguments for
dividend payouts low enough to avoid reliance on external equity financing.
On the other hand, dividends would alleviate the problems posed in this
paper if they help signal the true value of , thus reducing aA.
However, this is not necessarily an argument for high average payout; it
merely supports payout policies with a high correlation of changes in
dividends and changes in the value of assets in place. This could explain why
dividend payments respond to changes in earnings, not market value, if book
earnings primarily reflect the performance of assets-in-place.
At this point, we revert to our original three-date model, in which
asymmetric information is important only at t = 0.
Mergers
Our model's main message is this: given asymmetric information, a firm
with insufficient financial slack may not undertake all valuable investment
opportunities. Thus, a firm that has too little slack increases its value by
acquiring more.
One way to do this is by merger. In our model, a merger always creates
value when one firm's surplus slack fully covers the other's deficiency.2 8
Of course this gain is only one of dozens of possible merger motives. But we
have nothing to say here about other benefits or costs, so we will assume them
away here.
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It turns out that the same conditions that create a potential gain from
transferring surplus slack between merger partners will also complicate the
merger negotiations, and in some cases rule out any possibility of their
successful completion. Consider a firm with an existing business, a good
investment opportunity, but insufficient slack to pay for it. It seeks a
merger with a cash-rich firm. The would-be buyer only knows the distributions
of and , not the true values a and b.
Let Q' be the proposed merger price. That is, if the merger offer is
accepted, the shareholders of the cash-poor firm receive Q' in cash or
shares.29 If the offer is turned down, that firm's shareholders forego the
investment and are left with S + a. Thus, given a and b, the offer will
be accepted if Q' > S + a. However, the cash-rich firm will only
offer Q' S + A(N') + B(N'), where A(N') and B(N) are the expectations
of and conditional on observing that the cash-poor firm is willing to
go through with the deal.
Under these assumptions, the merger would never occur. The cash-poor firm
can always do better by issuing stock directly to investors, because P'
always exceeds Q'.30
In our model, the decision to sell shares always carries negative
information, regardless of whether the shares are sold to investors generally
or to a specific acquiring firm. The buyer or buyers discount the shares so
that cost equals expected payoff. If the firm issues E I - S, old
shareholders retain a stake, but if their firm is sold they are completely
disengaged from it. The decision to sell all of the firm via merger, rather
than issue the fraction E/(P' + E), drives down market price below P',
II
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because the firm has chosen to sell more stock than absolutely necessary to
cover the investment I. (We assume that (1) the acquiring firm's slack
exceeds the selling firm's deficiency (I - S), (2) the acquiring firm has
other assets, and (3) everyone knows what these assets are worth.)
Negotiated mergers thus seem to be ruled out (in this simple case)
regardless of financing, because the cash-poor firm can always do better by
issuing stock. How can mergers be explained under the premises of this paper?
There are two possible explanations. First, there may be partial or total
disclosure of internal information during negotiation. Second, the merger
may go through if the buyer rather than the seller takes the initiative. In
our model, firms with plenty of slack should seek out acquisition targets
which have good investment opportunities and limited slack, and about which
investors have limited information. Such firms sell at a discount from their
average potential value A + B + S.32 A tender offer made directly to
the slack-poor firm's shareholders, at a price above A + B + S - L, but
below A + B + S, makes both the bidder and the target's shareholders better
off ex ante, although neither buyer nor sellers know the true value
a + b + S. A cash tender offer conveys no bad news about a + b + S, so long
as the target's management are not accomplices. Perhaps this explains why
most mergers are initiated by buyers. A firm that actively seeks to be bought
out may end up a wallflower. The more actively management seeks to sell, the
less an outsider will assume their firm is worth.
_ 
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5. CONCLUSION
We have presented a model of the issue-investment decision when the firm's
managers have superior information. We can sum up by reviewing some of the
model's most interesting properties.
1. It is generally better to issue safe securities than risky ones.
Firms should go to bond markets for external capital, but raise equity by
retention if possible. That is, external financing using debt is better than
financing by equity.
2. Firms whose investment opportunities outstrip operating cash flows,
and which have used up their ability to issue low-risk debt, may forego good
investments rather than issue risky securities to finance them. This is done
in the existing stockholders' interest. However, stockholders are better off
ex ante-i.e., on average-when the firm carries sufficient financial slack to
undertake good investment opportunities as they arise.
The ex ante loss in value increases with the size of the required
equity issue. Thus, increasing the required investment or reducing slack
available for this investment also increases the ex ante loss. In addition,
numerical simulations indicate the loss decreases when the market's
uncertainty about the value of assets in place is reduced, or when the
investment opportunity's expected NPV is increased.
3. Firms can build up financial slack by restricting dividends when
investment requirements are modest. The cash saved is held as marketable
securities or reserve borrowing power.
The other way to build slack is by issuing stock in periods when
managers' information advantage is small; firms with insufficient slack to
cover possible future investment opportunities would issue in periods where
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managers have no information advantage. However, we have not derived a
generally optimal dynamic issue strategy.
4. The firm should not pay a dividend if it has to recoup the cash by
selling stock or some other risky security. Of course dividends could help
convey managers' superior information to the market. Our model suggests a
policy under which changes in dividends are highly correlated with managers'
estimate of the value of assets in place.33
5. When managers have superior information, and stock is issued to
finance investment, stock price will fall, other things equal. This action is
nevertheless in the (existing) stockholders' interest. If the firm issues
safe (default-risk free) debt to finance investment, stock price will not fall.
6. A merger of a slack-rich and slack-poor firm increases the firm's
combined value. However, negotiating such mergers will be hopeless unless the
slack-poor firms' managers can convey their special information to the
prospective buyers. If this information cannot be conveyed (and verified),
slack-poor firms will be bought out by tender offers made directly to their
shareholders. - "
Of course, the six items stated just above depend on the specific
assumptions of our model and may not follow in other contexts. We have only
explored one of many possible stories about corporate finance. A full
description of corporate financing and investmentsbehavior will no doubt
require telling several stories at once.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and
National Bureau of Economic Research; Universidad Catolica de Chile. This
paper draws on Majluf (1978) and an earlier (1978) joint working paper,
but it has undergone several major revisions and expansions. We thank
Fischer Black, George Constantinedes, Roger Gordon, Rene Stulz and an
anonymous referee for valuable comments. The office of Naval Research
sponsored the initial work on this paper.
2. We could interpret our time subscript not as calendar time, but just the
state of information available to the firm and market.
3. That is, managers may have inside information about the firm, but not
about the market or the economy.
4. An analogy may help make this clear. Think of a share of IBM stock
on January 1 (t -1). could be the unknown distribution of the
February 1 price, a the actual price on February 1 (t 0). However, a
fur trapper snowed in on the upper MacGregor River might not learn the
February 1 price until March 1 (t +1).
5. These payoffs appear to be create incentive to leave the cash in the bank,
and issue stock in state 2. However, that action would immediately reveal
the true state, forcing P' down to 60. If the firm does not have to
issue stock to undertake the project, smart investors will assume the
worst if it does issue, and the firm will find the issue unattractive.
6. Rights issues resolve the conflict of interest only if old stockholders
can be compelled to exercise their rights and hold the newly-issued shares.
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7. What is it that competitors want to know? There are two possibilities:
a. They want to know the value of the firm's assets and
opportunities-in our example, the true state, s 1 or 2. (In the
example, the firm cannot help revealing the true state if it has to
issue to invest.)
b. They want to know technology, product design, management
strategy, etc.-that is, how the value is generated. In this case,
knowing the true state would not help competitors at all.
We assume that the investment opportunity's NPV is independent of whether
stock has to be issued to finance it. Thus we are implicitly assuming
(b), not (a). But if (a) is important, then slack may have still another
payoff: If the firm does not have to issue to invest, it can more easily
conceal the true value of its assets and growth opportunities. Its ex
ante investment opportunity set, described by the distribution of A, may
be more favorable with slack than without it.
Issuing stock can fully reveal the true state s only in simple
two-state examples. But these comments also apply--if suitably watered
down--to the more general cases discussed in Section 3.
8. Downs and Heinkel (1982) present empirical evidence supporting the
Leland-Pyle analysis.
9. A formal proof is given in Majluf (1978), Appendix 2, pp. 286-290. See
Also pp. 142-143.
10. What if only part of the asset-in-place can be sold? If it can be sold at
intrinsic value, the firm treats the proceeds as additional slack and
looks again at its issue-invest decision.
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11. What if the asset-in-place can only be sold at a discount? What if the
potential buyer does not know its true value? What if sale of the
asset-in-place reduces b? These questions are worth exploring.
12. This is the case of market breakdown analyzed by Akerlof (1970).
13. Issue costs do not appear to change the structure of our model in any
fundamental way. However, we comment on them here because including them
may qualify our proof that stock price falls when the firm issues shares.
Suppose the firm incurs issue costs of T dollars. This increases
the amount it has to issue to finance the project from E to E + T.
That is, it must issue a gross amount E + T in order to net E.
The higher issue costs are, the smaller the fraction of the
post-issue shares held by old stockholders. The firm issues and invests
if:
Vold Pt (E + S + a + b) > S + a - Vold
issue P' + E + T no issue
or if E (S + a) < E + b
The market value P' of the old stockholders' shares conditional on issue
is as before given by Equation (2), but the region M' is now defined by
the inequality given just above.
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Issue costs appear to lead to two main differences in the equilibrium
properties of the model. First, the firm may issue and invest when its
investment opportunity's NPV is positive, but less than
T (O < b < T). This creates a different sort of real resource cost.
In this region, the project actually has negative NPV once issue costs are
allocated to it (b - T < 0). Nevertheless, the investment may be
rational if managers know the value of assets in place is sufficiently
low. If this outcome is possible, the ex ante market value of the firm
will be marked down accordingly.
Second, we can no longer say for sure that P' < P, and that the
decision to issue shares drives down the price. The proof given in the
text follows from the observation that A(M) > P' + S. With issue
costs, the corresponding statement is A(M) > P'( E + T S. It is
conceivable that A(M) would fall between P'( E ) - S and P' - S.E+T
The conditions under which this might happen are worth investigating
further. For present purposes, however, we have to assume that
transaction costs are a second-order effect.
14. "Other things" includes the expectation of given that it is positive.
15. MaJluf (1978) shows that at least one equilibrium P' exists if there is
a positive probability that the firm will issue stock. See his Appendix
1, pp. 279-285.
16. Reported in Majluf (1978) pp. 165-183.
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17. That is, the change in the debt value at t = 1 is independent of the
firm-specific information revealed to investors at that time. Other
things, such as a general shift in interest rates, may change debt value,
but that is irrelevant here.
18. See, for example, Galai and Masulis (1976). The option pricing framework
of course rests on more restrictive assumptions than those used so far in
this paper. We return to these assumptions below.
19. This is Rendleman's conclusion (1980). As noted above, he does not work
out a full equilibrium solution.
20. Note that the general version of our model, as described in Inequality (1)
and Equation (2), allows asymmetric information about
any feature of the joint distribution ( ,). But addressing the choice
among financing instruments requires more specific assumptions.
21. We thank George Constantinedes for suggesting this possibility.
22. If old shareholders are willing to hold all of any new investment--i.e.,
if a 1 in Table 2's expressions-the firm always invests if
b > 0. This is, of course, the ex ante optimal policy; the problem is
enforcing it. Old shareholders could enforce it by purchasing 100 percent
of any new issue (Case I) or by not selling any of their shares (Case II).
However, note that the incentive for old shareholders to buy all of a
new issue is strongest if they act in concert. Management looks at the
overall a. An investor who holds, say, one percent of the firm's
stock, and who acts alone, buying one percent of the new issue, will reap
only one percent of his action's rewards. If arranging a group action is
costly, then individual investors' incentives will not make a 1
overall.
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In Case II, a - 1 if old shareholders do not trade when the firm
invests. Financial slack helps by making sure that old shareholders buy
all of the new project, at least temporarily. Trading costs then limit
the extent of selling. If their portfolios are "sticky," the conflict of.
interest between old and new shareholders is reduced. However, any
investor who sells out will not face the full cost of his actions, since
management's decision depends on old stockholders' overall participation
in the new project.
23. Existing securityholders could protect against this ripoff by taking a pro
rata share of each new issue. But this would be cumbersome at best. It
would also invite a different kind of ripoff, in which outside
securityholders buy an overpriced issue while insiders and their friends
sell or sell short.
24. This suggests the idea that managers could avoid conflicts between old and
new shareholders by concealing the firm's investment decision. Take Case
II in Table 2, where the firm has ample slack. Suppose its investment
decision is not revealed until t - +1. Then the firm's actions prompt no
trading at t 0, and good investment opportunities are not bypassed. In
Case I, on the other hand, the investment decision cannot be concealed
because a stock issue necessarily comes first.
25. Miller and Rock's model would predict the same negative stock price impact
regardless of the type of security issued.
26. You would expect that the riskier the instrument issued, the greater the
issues' impact on the market value of the firm. However, we have not been
able to prove that this positive relationship is always monotonic.
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27. "Our model" includes the assumption that managers act in old stockholders'
interests, and that those stockholders are passive in the sense discussed
above.
28. If the merged firms' total slack does not fully cover their investment
requirements, the merger may or may not increase value. See Majluf
(1978), pp. 239-256.
29. We assume for simplicity that the true value of any shares used to finance
the merger is independent of a and b. A more elaborate analysis is
needed if they are not independent. A further complication is introduced
if (1) the merger is financed by shares and (2) the buying firm's
management has superior information about what those shares are worth.
30. A proof follows. Define a*(N') as the breakeven value of a, the value
at which the cash-poor firm is just indifferent to being acquired at the
equilibrium price Q'. Note that Q' - a*(N') + S. Refer again to (la),
the requirement for the firm to issue stock:
E/P'(S + a) < E + b
If P' were equal to Q', the firm would issue and invest at a*(N') for
any b > 0. That is, if P' = Q' = S + a*(N'),
E E
p (S + a) S+ a*(N') (S + a*(N')) E < E + b
Thus a*(M'), the breakeven value of a at which the firm is just willing
to issue stock, exceeds a*(N') for any b > 0.
Thus, A(M') + B(M') > A(N') + B(N') and P' > Q'.
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31. The cash-poor firm would prefer to negotiate with a firm that is not a
competitor. A competitor might back out of the negotiations and take
advantage of information acquired in them. This hazard is less in a
"conglomerate" merger.
32. We assume the target firm has not yet declared its issue-invest decision.
33. However, there is no mechanism in our model to insure that such a policy
would be faithfully followed.
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